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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR CHOPER: LAYING
DOWN ANOTHER LADDER
Sheri Lynn Johnsont
Professor Simson has commented on Professor Choper's Establishment Clause approach, so I will confine my remarks to the free
exercise section of Choper's lecture.' Choper described his intent as
twofold: primarily to outline an approach to the Religion Clauses and
secondarily, to contrast the religion cases with equal protection doctrine. 2 I think it is clear that he undertakes the contrast in order to
defend his approach against doctrinal arguments that arise from equal
protection parallels.
I have no quarrel with his free exercise approach standing alone.
Indeed, I think I would applaud the results in almost any free exercise
case I can imagine. I am no happier than he is at the Court's introduction of an intent requirement into the free exercise case law. Nevertheless, I am disturbed by Choper's remarks. The contrast he
develops between race discrimination and free exercise claims risks
further damage to race discrimination claims by bolstering the
Court's present approach to the intent-effect distinction in race discrimination claims.
Regarding the intent-effect distinction, Choper starts by noting
that actions intended to disadvantage either a racial or religious group
are both properly subject to exacting scrutiny, but that the Court has
declined to give anything but the most deferential review to race-neutral laws that have disproportionately advantaging effects on racial minorities.3 Although he first hedges on whether or not this
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is correct 4 he quickly
adds that" 'generally applicable religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice' are more threateningto
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, University of Minnesota; J.D.
1979, Yale Law School.
1 Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1994). I would also take issue with Choper's description of affirmative action-but will not do so here.
2 Id. at 491.
3 Id. at 508.
4 Id. In his response to questions, Choper acknowledged that he would be "less than
candid" if he did not admit that he was inclined toward the view that disadvantaging race
neutral laws should not be afforded heightened scrutiny. Jesse H. Choper, Address at the
Cornell Annual Robert S. Stevens Lecture Series (Sept. 8, 1993).
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constitutional values than government action that has a disproportionate impact on minority racial groups."5
It is here that we part company. For reasons I will shortly address,
I would prefer to avoid any such hierarchical comparisons of constitutional wrongs. First, however, I would note that the reasoning Professor Choper offers to support his judgment of which disparate effects
more threaten constitutional values is persuasive only to one already
persuaded.
Professor Choper argues that unintentionally burdening a religious practice is more offensive than unintentionally burdening a minority racial group. 6 He contends that race neutral laws do not injure
members of minority racial groups "because of' their race, whereas
religion neutral laws that burden a particular religious practice do injure persons "because of' their religion. 7 I have two objections to this
analysis.
First, I think that race-neutral laws often do injure "because of'
race. When a decisionmaker-whether a legislator, a judge or a juror-acts with unconscious racial bias, such actions would generally be
labeled "race-neutral" under present law,8 yet to my mind they are
clearly made "because of' race. Or a decisionmaker's choices may reflect selective indifference 9 to a racial outgroup; a legislator might be
undeterred by the negative effects on a racial minority of otherwise
desirable legislation when she would be deterred were those effects
visited on her own racial group. Here too I think it fair to say that the
loser lost "because of' her race.10
Moreover, even in the situation Choper seems to think is more
typical-where the racially disproportionate impact is completely untouched by racial considerations on the part of the decisionmaker-I
think the person of color is disadvantaged "because of' her race.
Choper argues that the person of color is harmed not "because of'
her race but only "because the minority group members are disproportionately
representedin the largergroup affected. "II I think it is snapshot history to
say that such persons do not suffer adverse consequences "because of'
5 Choper, supra note 1, at 508 (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990)) (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 509.
7 Id.
8 See generally Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing the relationship between the
unconscious and racially discriminatory practices).
9 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1976).

10 Thus I disagree with Choper's assertions that inquiry into the motivations of
lawmakers is a "manageable task" and that intentional racial discrimination "will ordinarily
be fairly clear." Choper, supra note 1, at 496.
11 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
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their race. As Professor Choper himself pointed out, the "larger
group affected" often is the poor, or the poorly educated. With a less
restricted time frame, it is clear that many African Americans and
other racial minorities are poor because of their race and thus they are
disadvantaged "because of' their race by legislation that adversely affects the poor or poorly educated. That this disadvantage does not
happen all at once does not mean that it is not attributable to race.
I suspect that Choper might respond that a significant difference
remains, for he also claims that religion-neutral laws that burden a
particular practice constitute "because of' discrimination in that "all
persons who suffer the special operative consequences adverse to their belief systern are necessarily members of that religion and all members of that
religion suffer the special operative adverse consequences."' 2 The implication is that the same could not be said for disadvantaging race
neutral laws; generally, not all members of a racial minority are disadvantaged and not all persons disadvantaged by the legislation are
members of the minority group.
But the distinction created by the set of exclusive sets Choper has
constructed is a sleight of hand. Of course, only persons with the religious belief in question will "suffer. ..consequences adverse to their belief
system";' 3 this is so by definition. Other persons, however, will suffer
from the operation of the statute. Unless I misunderstand the peyote example, many other persons will suffer from not being able to use the
peyote they desire. Moreover, I suppose that in many cases, some
members of the religious group would suffer no disadvantaging effects; their age, gender, status or occupation would exempt them from
the conflict between religious duties and secular advantage that others
in the religious group would face. Finally, some persons of the disadvantaged religious group who do suffer under the statute will not suffer religious consequences. Perhaps they will choose to go to jail or
leave the country, thus making choices and suffering consequences
very similar to those of some nonreligious peyote users. That the religious person can be said to suffer those consequences for a different
reason, that is, her religious beliefs, does not differentiate the two
kinds of disparate effects. The person of color who suffers under a
statute that disadvantages the poorly educated can be said to suffer
"for a different reason," that is, the history of racial discrimination
that deprived her of a decent education, than does the white person
disadvantaged by that statute. Thus I am not persuaded that religiondisadvantaging effects are more "because of' than are race-disadvantaging effects.
12
13

Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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The second reason I am not persuaded by the "because of' distinction Choper utilizes to place free exercise "effects" on a different
footing than racially disparate effects is my view that "because of' discrimination provides a too limited vision of the goal of equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems to me that the
Fourteenth Amendment is best read to have a cluster of objectives,
which include but are not limited to "because of' race discrimination.
This is a much larger topic, about which others have written extensively, so I will simply say that I would not prioritize "because of' discrimination as the central meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
From the victim's perspective, effects are of far greater importance
than intent. 14 Regardless of whose perspective is adopted, some particular effects are of great importance; certainly subordination,
stigma, second class citizenship, and prejudice are among the evils
that must be eradicated before racial equality is possible. 15
Thus, I reject this comparison between effects on race and religion both because it is unpersuasive and because it presumes the paramountcy of "because of' discrimination as the focus of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I also would abjure such a comparison as counterproductive. It reminds me of a related discussion that I have every
year with my constitutional law class comparingthe reasons for treating
race as suspect with the reasons for treating gender as suspect. This
discussion all too often degenerates into a fierce "which is worse?" argument. Unfortunately, such wars of gender rights versus race rights
16
are not limited to first year students.
In any such competition among oppressed groups, whether between racial and religious minorities or between racial minorities and
white women, much can be said for either side. But saying it tends to
make combatants out of natural allies and distracts us from common
interests. I doubt that such jockeying for position is likely to increase
the level of protection for either oppressed group. Struggles for the
higher rung only legitimate the ladder; here too, it is time to lay the
17
ladder down.
14
See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw, 62 MrNN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (examining disadvantages in employment,
education, and housing which do not violate antidiscrimination law).
15 See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 941-46 (1989) (reviewing various conceptions of discrimination and citing their
proponents).
16 For a recent hair-raising example, see Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U.
COLO. L. Ray. 375 (1992).
17 "We cannot exploit, or neglect, any particular set of individuals and expect our
global human community to thrive .... When we keep the whole in mind, we have laid
the ladder down." BEr= JEAN CRAIGE, LAYING THE LADDER DowN: THE EMERGENCE OF
CULTURAL HoUSM 116 (1992).
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Still, I wish to reiterate that I am sympathetic to Choper's desire
to gain protection for religious practices impeded by neutral statutes.
I understand his desire not to have the intent-effect distinctionwhich is well established in race doctrine, although I hope not permanently-to be transplanted into free exercise doctrine. I just wish he
would proceed in a way that did not further entrench what I consider
to be wrongheaded thinking about racially disparate effects. I wonder
if instead of arguing whether religion-disadvantaging effects or racially
disparate effects are worse (or which more closely resemble "because
of' discrimination), Choper might reformulate his argument to trace
how the effects are simply different.'8
They are different in the kind of harm they threaten, rather than
the degree of a single kind of harm. It seems to me that in assessing
racially disparate effects we are most concerned with distributive justice, while with respect to effects on religious practice we are most
concerned with coercing beliefs. Although persons may suffer economic losses for religious beliefs, and persons may be pressured to
"pass" to escape various racial effects, the primary concerns in these
two areas are sharply different. These different animating concerns to
me would be reason enough to unhook the two analyses-and would
render unnecessary comparisons between the severity of the threat
posed to constitutional values by statutes neutral-but-disadvantaging to
race and religion.

18
SeeTrina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, ObscuringtheImportance ofRace: The Implication of Making ComparisonsBetween Racism and Sexism (Or Other-Isms), 1991 DuKE L.J. 397,
for an example of such an argument.

